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Teresa Ripoll de Lemaitre, and Armando Galvis. A first draft of
this paper was written while the author was a Visiting Fellow at
the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies of
Harvard University in the fall of 1999.2
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the fiscal revenues of Cartagena de Indias, the
main port of the Viceroyalty of New Granada during the colonial period
and one of the principal military bastions of Spain in the Caribbean in
the eighteenth century.
1  The period analyzed extends from 1751 to
1810.
Over the last three decades one of the areas of Spanish America’s
colonial economic history in which more interesting work has been
done is that of fiscal history. In particular, Herbert S. Klein and John J.
TePaske have published the records of tax revenues and expenditures
for many areas of the Spanish empire in the New World, including New
Spain, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, and Rio de la Plata.
2 These
records are important because, for an era in which there is very little
                                     
1 The Viceroyalty of New Granada comprised the territory of what are now the republics of
Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. The discussion in this paper refers only to the area of the
viceroyalty  that corresponds to present day Colombia.
2 Herbert S. Klein and John J. TePaske, Ingresos y egresos de la Real Hacienda en Nueva España,
Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, México, 1986, and 1988;  Herbert S. Klein and John J.
TePaske, The Royal Treasuries of  the Spanish Empire in America , Duke University Press,
Durham, North Carolina, 1982,, Vol. 1 (Peru), Vol 2 (Bolivia), Vol 3 (Chile and the Rio de la Plata);
Alvaro Jara and John J. TePaske, The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America , Duke
University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1990, Vol. 4 (Ecuador).3
statistical information, the evolution and structure of tax revenues can
serve as an approximation to the behavior of production and income.
For example, in a recent book, Herbert S. Klein uses data on fiscal
income and expenditures to trace long-term changes in the level of
economic activity in Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia, from 1680 to 1809. 
3
Unfortunately, Klein and TePaske did not reconstruct the fiscal
accounts of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. This paper is part of a
larger project, undertaken to fill the gap left by Klein and TePaske, by
consolidating the fiscal revenues of New Granada from 1751 to 1810.
4
Here I study the revenues of  Cartagena, Spain´s main royal treasury in
the Viceroyalty of New Granada, from the perspective of total
revenues. A key feature of the viceroyalty’s public finances is clearly
shown: the interior provinces subsidized the Caribbean port of
Cartagena with transfers that were a very large burden within one of
the poorer viceroyalties of the Spanish empire. In turn, the city’s
                                     
3 Herbert S. Klein,The American Finances of the Spanish Empire, Royal Income and Expenditure in
Colonial Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia, 1680-1810 , University of New Mexico Press, USA, 1998, p. xi.   
4  As part of that project the author obtained from the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, Spain,
the fiscal  records for more than twenty regional treasuries operating in New Granada in the late
eighteenth century. The Banco de la Republica, the Colombian Central Bank, the institution for
which he works, funded the research in the Archivo de Indias during the summer of 1998. The data4
economy was heavely dependent on those transfers. That is, it was a
subsidy-led economy.
II.  CARTAGENA DE INDIAS IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: POPULATION, DEFENSES, AND
ECONOMY
The only general population census in the Viceroyalty of New Granada
was undertaken in 1777. In that year,  the province of Cartagena, with
a population of 118.242, participated with 14.2% of the total population
of the territory of what is now Colombia. The capital of Cartagena
province, Cartagena de Indias, located on the Caribbean coast, was
the second largest city of the  Viceroyalty  and its main seaport.
The population of Cartagena de Indias grew rapidly throughout most
the eighteenth century due to the prosperity of the  local economy,
especially in the decades that preceded independence from Spain.
                                                                                                                
used in this paper is based on the Cartas Cuentas of Cartagena obtained from the Archivo de
Indias.5
In the census of 1777 the total population of Cartagena de Indias was
13.690 inhabitants. The largest group was the “freemen of all colors”,
which included some free blacks, but was mainly composed of
mulattoes. Whites represented 31.2 % of the city’s population and the
black slaves, 18.9%.
5
Among the whites the main occupations were commerce and the
military, which reflects very well the character of the city: Cartagena
was a fortified port.
Cartagena was a key hub for Spanish trade in the northern coast of
South America, since through her port silver, from the mines of  Peru
and Bolivia, and gold, from New Granada, was shipped to Spain. Thus,
the city was very alluring to the pirates of different nationalities, that
roamed the Caribbean Sea.
In the sixteenth century the city was attacked and sacked  several
times by French and English buccaneers: Robert Baal (1542), Martin
Cote (1559), John Hawkins (1568), Francis Drake (1586). As a result,
                                     
5 Adolfo Meisel Roca y Maria Aguilera Díaz , “Cartagena de Indias en 1777: Un análisis6
the Spanish authorities designed a defensive strategy for the city and
built a system of forts along the bay (see Map).
Beginning in the early seventeenth century,  heavy stone ramparts
were built along most of the city’s perimeter. By 1638, it was almost
completely surrounded by a system of fortifications and walls.
6
However, throughout the rest of the colonial period the city´s military
defenses  were constantly improved and expanded.
                                                                                                                
demográfico”, Boletín cultural y bibliográfico , Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, Volumen XXXIV, No.
45, 1997, p. 31.
6 Rodolfo Segovia, Las fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias. Estrategia e historia , Carlos
Valencia Editores, 1987, p. 24.78
The “golden period” of military constructions in Cartagena was the
second half of the eighteenth century, when the Spanish Crown,
concerned about the takeover of Havana by the British in 1762,
constructed additional military fortifications and reinforced those that
already existed.
7 By 1810, on the eve of independence, Cartagena had
an impressive defensive system. The larger of the two entrances to the
bay, Bocagrande, was sealed by an underwater wall, la escollera,
which was built between 1762 and 1778.
8 As a result, to reach the bay
ships had to pass through a very narrow entrance, Bocachica, which
was flanked by forts on both shores, San Fernando and San Jose. In
addition, an iron chain was laid between San Fernando and San Jose,
to further control the entrance of enemy ships.
If an attacking fleet was able to force its way into the bay by overtaking
the fortifications at Bocachica, it still had to evade or silence the
crossfire of two sets of forts along the bay before reaching the city,
which was completely surrounded by walls and fortifications and was
                                     
7 Ibid. , p. 55-79.
8 Juan Manuel Zapatero, Historia de las fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias , Ediciones Cultura
Hispánica, Madrid, 1979, p. 153.9
guarded by the San Felipe Castle, a massive fortress that checked any
land approaches southeast of the town proper.
When in 1741 a fleet of 124 vessels under the command of British
Admiral Edward Vernon attacked Cartagena, the forts in Bocachica
were almost completely destroyed and the invaders were able to enter
the bay. The attacking forces consisted of 15.000 sailors and 8.000
foot soldiers, while only about 3.000 men defended the city. However,
the invaders lost several hundred men in an unsuccessful attempt to
overtake San Felipe Castle. This defeat, plus the delay of over a week
trying to force their way through Bocachica, turned out to be fatal for
the British,  by then tropical diseases had begun to take a heavy toll on
the troops.  Vernon and his fleet had to retreat, having failed to take
over Cartagena at a loss of more than 8.000 men.
9 The effectiveness
of the city’s military defenses was thus proven.
Cartagena was Spain´s  most important fortified port in the Caribbean,
after Havana. For its defense it not only required an array of10
fortifications, but also the continuous  presence of professional troops.
In the final decades of the eighteenth century the city was protected by
the  Regimiento Fijo,  comprised  of Spaniards and white Spanish-
Americans. In the 1770´s, for example, the Regimiento Fijo had more
than 800 soldiers and officers.
10 Thus the military was the main
occupation of local whites. The other important activity of the local
economy was commerce, which was closely tied with the role of the
city as New Granada’s main seaport. Cartagena handled most of the
Viceroyalty’s imports and exports.
The economy of Cartagena in the second half of the eighteenth century
was very dynamic for several reasons. First, the numerous military
constructions undertaken in this period were an important source of
employment and revenue for the local economy. Also, the large
number of troops permanently stationed in Cartagena represented an
important source of employment and income. Finally, Cartagena
enjoyed a monopoly on foreign trade in the Viceroyalty of New
                                                                                                                
9 Julián de Zulueta, “Health and Military Factors in Vernon’s Failure at Cartagena”, The Mariner’s
Mirror, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1992.
10 Juan Marchena, La institucion militar en Cartagena de Indias, 1700-1810 , Escuela de Estudios
Hispanoamericanos, Sevilla, 1982, pp. 168-169.11
Granada and all revenues from levies on imports and exports were
spent locally.
In contrast with the economic vitality of Cartagena towards the end of
the colonial period, its hinterland was sparsely populated, with almost
no commercial agriculture for foreign markets, and with agricultural
production mainly supplying the consumption needs of Cartagena and
Mompox, the main Caribbean cities of New Granada. As a result, the
presence of slavery in rural areas of the Province of Cartagena was
very limited. For example, in 1777 slaves represented only 6.7 % of the
population of the province, not including the capital.
11
Thus, it should be emphasized that the economic vitality of Cartagena
de Indias in the second half of the eighteenth century did not depend
on conditions in its hinterland. Quite the contrary, the limited
agricultural activity in its rural areas was, to a large extent, brought
about by the consumption needs of the city.
                                     
11 Meisel y Aguilera, Op. Cit. , p. 32.12
III. TRENDS AND STRUCTURE OF THE FISCAL REVENUES OF
CARTAGENA DE INDIAS, 1751-1810
Between 1751 and 1810 the net fiscal revenues of Cartagena de Indias
expanded rapidly, with an average annual rate of increase over the
period of 2.8 % (see Graph 1).
12  Over this time period three distinct
phases can be observed. The first extended approximately from 1751
to 1769. During this initial period the average annual rate of increase of
total net revenues was 2.1%. In the next phase, 1770-1785, net fiscal
revenues grew very rapidly, at an annual rate of 6.7%. Finally, from
1786 to 1810 revenues remained relatively stagnant, albeit at
historically high levels, with wide fluctuations from year to year.
                                     
12  Since the fiscal accounts reported by the Spanish authorities included stocks and flows as well
as transfers of funds destined for other royal treasuries, to obtain the net fiscal revenues I have
eliminated carryovers from previous years, transfers, deposits, and uncollected debts. To a large
extent on this issue I have followed the example of Herbert Klein, “Structure and Profitability of
Royal Finances in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata”, Hispanic American Historical Review , Vol.
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     GRAPH 1
NET FISCAL REVENUES OF CARTAGENA DE INDIAS
    (1751-1851)
Pesos
What factors explain the sustained increase in the fiscal revenues of
Cartagena in the late colonial period ? There are five possible answers:
1) inflation  2) population growth 3) increases in per-capita income 4)
increases in the degree of tax pressure and 5) increases in the
subsidies received from other regions. I now analize the possible
contribution of each one of them.14
There has been very little research on the behavior of prices during the
colonial period in New Granada. The only price index available for the
late eighteenth century shows that in the period 1753-1804 there was
no tendency for prices to change over the long- run ( zero average
inflation).
13 Thus the increase observed in the fiscal revenues of
Cartagena was not a monetary phenomenon.
Since it is well known that before the industrial revolution the long–run
tendency of per-capita income was to remain stagnant, I will assume in
this paper that the average annual increase in Cartagena´s per-capita
income was zero.
14 Thus, we only have three other possible
explanations for the increase in the city’s fiscal revenues:  population
growth, increases in the subsidies from other regions, and an increase
in the amount of tax pressure.
In the later part of the colonial period the total population of Cartagena
expanded rapidly. While its population in 1777 was  13.690 inhabitants,
                                     
13 Alberto Pardo Pardo, Geografía económica y humana de Colombia , Ediciones Tercer Mundo,
Bogotá, 1972, p. 221. To calculate the trend in the price index from 1753 to 1804, the values for
1797 and 1798 were not included, since they are clearly outliers.
14 Robert Lucas, “The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future”, The Forum Public Policy Lecture
Series , USA, 1996, p. 11.   15
by 1810 it had increased to 25.000.
15 The average annual rate of
population increase between these two dates was 1.8 %. Thus, to a
large extent the increase in tax revenues corresponded to the growth in
population. However, tax revenues increased at an annual rate that
was 1.0 % above the rate population growth. That remaining 1.0% can
be explained basically by the per-capita increase of the subsidy
received by Cartagena from other regions to pay for its military
expenses and which was known as the situado.
16 The situado
increased at an average annual rate of 2.7 % from 1751 to 1810, that
is, 0.9 % above the rate of population growth.
The major source of outside income for Cartagena was the situado,
which can be seen as a payment for the “exports” of military protection
that the port offered. Thus, military activities constituted the economic
base of the city and most of the other activities derived from  this main
function. As a result it can be expected that the situado was a
determining factor in the evolution of tax revenues collected on local
                                     
15 Manuel Ezequiel Corrales, Documentos para la historia de la provincia de Cartagena , Imprenta
Raimundo Rivas, Bogota, 1883, p. 368.
16 Most of the situado that Cartagena received came from other regions of the Viceroyalty of New
Granada. However, in at least four occasions resources were transferd from Havana, during the
period 1751-1810. These sums were almost certainly part of the situado that the Viceroyalty of New
Spain sent each year to Cuba, to be distributed throughout the  Spanish Caribbean.16
transactions, such as those paid  on the consumption of tobacco,
liquor, and meat. This is confirmed by a Granger causality test, which
shows that, statistically, the situado caused local taxes,  but local taxes
did not cause the situado (see Table 1).
17
During the later half of the eighteenth century there was probably also
some increase in the degree of tax pressure, especially through the
taxes on liquor and tobacco, the main sources of local tax revenues,
since these increased at a slightly higher rate than the subsidies ( 3.0
% annually, compared to 2.7 %).
                                     
17 It was found that the situado and the local taxes were cointegrated in the period 1751-1810.
Lags 1
Observations 49
Null hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability
Local taxes does not Granger cause situado 1,52 0,23
Situado does not Granger cause local taxes 6,27 0,02
Note: For the situado, a three year moving average was used, since the series 




The above analysis highlights the enormous weight of the situado in
the public finances of Cartagena. In Graph 2, it is shown that, in the
later part of the eighteenth century, the overall behavior of the city’s
total fiscal receipts was very similar to that of the situado. The
correlation coefficient between these two variables for the period 1751-
1810 was 0.91. Furthermore, over the same period the situado
represented on average 49.6 % of the total revenues of Cartagena´s
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                                                       GRAPH 2
NET FISCAL REVENUES AND SITUADO RECEIVED BY CARTAGENA DE INDIAS
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                                    GRAPH 3
TOTAL NET FISCAL REVENUES OF CARTAGENA DE INDIAS
             COMPARED WITH THE MAIN REVENUES





Note: The main revenues were the situado and the taxes
           on liquor, tobbaco, averia, customs, and sisa.
It is relevant to consider the situado received by Cartagena de Indias
within the context of the royal finances of the Spanish Empire in the
New World. Beginning at the end of the sixteenth century a series of
intra-imperial remittances on a regular  basis (situados)  w e r e
established by the crown for the support of  key military bastions. Many
of these bastions were located in the Caribbean, and the transfers
were assigned to pay for the salaries of  troops and for the19
maintenance and construction of fortifications, in amounts that local tax
revenues could not match.
In the last half of the eighteenth century the city that benefited from the
largest subsidies through the  situado  was Havana, which received
these transfers from the Viceroyalty of New Spain. New Spain also
subsidized on a regular basis military defenses in other Spanish
strongholds in and around the Caribbean, such as Santo Domingo,
Puerto Rico, Cumaná, and Trinidad.
18
The transfers to Havana were very large.  By decades, the average
annual situado sent to Havana by New Spain for the period between
1750 and 1799 was, in silver pesos, 1.400.000, 1.900.000, 1.900.000,
5.219.000, and 2.674.000, respectively.
19 In per-capita terms, the
transfers Havana received from New Spain for its military expenses
were also quite large. Between 1751 and 1790, its annual per-capita
situado was 41 silver pesos.
20     
                                     
18 Carlos Marichal and Matilde Souto Mantecon, “Silver and Situados: New Spain and the Financing
of the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean in the Eighteenth Century”, Hispanic American Historical
Review , 74, 4, 1994, p. 603.
19 Ibid. , p. 603.
20 Calculations  based on Allan J. Kuethe, “Guns, Subsidies, and Commercial Privilege: Some
Historical Factors in the Emergence of the Cuban National Character, 1763-1815”, Cuban Studies,
16, 1986, p. 130.20
After Havana, the second city in the Caribbean in the value of the
situado  it obtained was Cartagena de Indias. From 1751 to 1810,
Cartagena received a total amount of 20.912.677 silver pesos in
situados from other treasuries, equivalent to an average of 19 silver
pesos per capita. Though less than half of Havana´s, Cartagena´s per
capita situado was a very significant factor in its economy. Since during
this period the daily wage of a laborer was  1.5 reales, the annual wage
must have been around 37.5 silver pesos.
21 Thus, in the later part of
the eighteenth century, each year for every inhabitant, the city was
subsidized through the situado in the equivalent of one-third the annual
salary of an unskilled worker.
During the final decades of the eighteenth century the Spanish
authorities often referred to the commercial elite of Cuba as “los
llorones cubanos”, because it was perceived that they were always
wailing and moaning for more commercial privileges on behalf of
military defense needs, particularly after the loss of Havana to the
                                     
21 Hermes Tovar, Hacienda colonial y formación social , Sendai Ediciones, Barcelona, 1988, p. 173.21
British in 1762.
22 Allan J. Kuethe argues that Cuba might well be
viewed as a spoiled colony. The same could also be said of Cartagena,
which for the Viceroyalty of New Granada, one of the poorer sections
of the empire, represented an enormous burden in terms of the
situado. Certainly in this period, for the rest of the Viceroyalty,
Cartagena could be viewed as a spoiled city. That the interior
provinces resented the subsidy they sent to “los llorones cartageneros”
became evident as soon as the independence movement got
underway and they began  restricting or eliminating outright the situado
for Cartagena.
23
                                     
22 Allan J. Kuethe, “Los Llorones Cubanos: the socio-military basis of commercial privilege in the
American trade under Charles IV”, Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, editors, The North
American role in the Spanish imperial economy , Manchester University Press, Great Britain, 1984.
23 By  1810 Cartagena was already feeling the economic consequences of the reduction in the
situado, since the sums sent to the port had already been restricted by Santa Fe de Bogota, as well
as Mompox. The situado received in 1810,  212.500 pesos, was the lowest since 1798 and only
44.2% of the amount for 1809. On November 3, 1810,  Tomas de Andres Torres, President of the
provisional local Junta, in a letter to the President of the Junta of New Granada, expressed his fears
about the future of Cartagena´s economy in the absence of the situado, given that local revenues
were insufficient to cover for its fiscal expenditures, Carta de Tomas de Andres Torres al Presidente
de la Suprema Junta Provincial,  Archivo personal de Celedonio Piñeres, Cartagena. A year later,
Jose Maria Garcia de Toledo, one of the main leaders of the independence movement in Cartagena
and who was executed by the Spaniards when they recovered the city in 1815, expressed his
doubts about the wisdom of Cartagena having declared its independence  from Spain instead of
waiting to have done so jointly with the rest of the provinces of New Granada. Garcia de Toledo
believed that had the Cartageneros waited to declare their independence from Spain together with
the rest of New Granada, the other provinces would have felt more committed to provide the
situado, Corrales, Op. Cit., p.369. During the short lived First Republic of Cartagena, 1811-1815,
the city went through a deep financial crisis since it had to depend on the revenues of local taxes to
pay for the local government´s expenses. In 1812, Manuel Rodriguez Torices, the Vicepresident of
the new republic, complained that over the preceding two years  Cartagena had only received
200.000 pesos of situado, while her annual expenditures amounted to 650.000 to 700.000 pesos,
Jose Manuel Restrepo,  Documentos importantes de Nueva Granada, Venezuela y Colombia,
Tomo V, Impenta Nacional, Bogota, 1969, p. 64. Among the mechanisms used to finance the fiscal
deficit in this period were confiscations, obligatory loans, and the issuing of paper money, for the
first time in the history of New Granada.            22
It is significant to note that the situado was not only the main cause of
economic growth in Cartagena. It was also the most important source
of outside resources for the Caribbean Coast of New Granada.
According to the merchant Jose Ignacio de Pombo, one of the better
informed analysts of economic matters in the period that preceded
independence from Spain, around 1805  the Viceroyalty of New
Granada exported  a total of 3.500.000 silver pesos : 3.000.000 in
minerals and 500.000 in other primary products.
24  Almost all mineral
exports, mostly gold, came from the provinces of Popayán, Chocó, and
Antioquia. The other primary  products included cocoa from Ecuador,
hides from various regions in  the Viceroyalty, and pearls from
Panama. It is almost impossible to calculate the participation of the
Caribbean Coast  in the total exports of New Granada. However we
know that gold exports from the region were practically zero. If all the
other primary products exported had originated in the Caribbean
Coast, which was obviously not true, the region´s share in total exports
would have been  12.5 %,  still less than its share in total population.
                                     
24 Sergio Elias Ortiz, compilador, Escritos de dos economistas coloniales , Banco de la Republica,
Bogotá, 1965, p. 127.23
Furthermore,  the situado assigned to Cartagena in the first decade of
the nineteenth century was clearly larger than the Caribbean Coast´s
total yearly exports, since, on average, the city’s annual situado in that
decade was of 642.410 silver pesos. Thus, while New Granadas’s
exports per-capita amounted to one silver peso and six reales, the
situado  represented “exports” of two silver pesos and four reales per-
capita for the region.
It is clear, then, that a key element of the economy of the provinces of
the north coast of the Viceroyalty of New Granada was the situado,
which sustained the economy of its main city. In turn, Cartagena
demanded agricultural supplies from its sparsely populated hinterland.
The other main important sources of fiscal revenues for Cartagena in
this period  were excise taxes on liquor, tobacco, and meat (sisa), and
duties on foreign trade (see Table 2). The correlation coefficient
between the totals for these revenues plus the situado with the total net
fiscal revenues of Cartagena was 0.97.  Graph 4 shows that for most of
the period 1751-1810 the variations and levels of  total net fiscal24
revenues and the sum of its main sources is very similar. For a few
years in the 1790’s, total revenues were somewhat higher than the
main revenues. The reason is that in those years there were often
sales of  properties expropriated from the Jesuits (temporalidades) and
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                           GRAPH 4
         SHARE OF THE SITUADO IN THE
TOTAL REVENUES OF CARTAGENA DE INDIAS
                         (1751-1810)25
As shown in Table 2, duties on foreign trade and the excise tax on
tobacco and liquor were the main fiscal revenues after the situado.
25
However, it should be noted that the cost of raising taxes was not the
same for all of them. For example, the duties on foreign trade required
a relatively small outlay per peso collected. Between 1780 and 1788,
5.7% of revenues was spent for the collection of foreign duties.
26 In
contrast, for the collection of liquor taxes in the period 1780-1787,
expenses were  46.7% of revenues. Something similar was observed
in the case of taxes on tobacco, for which 50.3% of revenues were
spent in raising them in the period 1779-1782.
27 As a result, levies on
foreign trade were, after the situado, by far the most important fiscal
revenue for the treasury of Cartagena in the last decades of colonial
rule.
                                     
25 After the 1780’s all the taxes on foreign trade were consolidated. Before that date there were
several levies on foreign trade, but only the averia, the main tax, is presented here.
26 Germán Colmenares, Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada , Banco
Popular, Bogotá, 1989, Tomo 1, Anexos.
27 Ibid.Period
Part. % Part. % Part. % Part. % Part. % Part. %  (8) Part. %
(1)  (2)  (2/1) (3) (3/1) (4) (4/1) (5)  (5/1) (6) (6/1) (7) (7/1) (2 to 7)  (8/1)
1751-1755 1.353.433 107.832
2 7,97 - - 137.947 10,19 632.417 46,73 172.508 12,75 1.050.704 77,63
1756-1760 1.421.287 99.542 7,00 - - 87.720 6,17 839.229 59,05 44.818 3,15 1.071.309 75,38
1761-1765 1.903.733 116.543 6,12 30.657




2 7,34 - 94.967
4 7,54 585.947
1 46,51 27.643
1 2,19 1.009.034 80,09
1771-1775 2.008.505 261.902 13,04 174.458 8,69 - 96.614 4,81 952.548 47,43 37.444 1,86 1.522.966 75,83
1776-1780 3.355.560 355.091 10,58 292.135 8,71 - 88.721 - 1.822.747 54,32 56.331 1,68 2.615.025 77,93
1781-1785 4.180.423 401.975 9,62 316.211 7,56 645.075 15,43 - 2.014.018 48,18 48.882 1,17 3.426.161 81,96
1786-1790 5.425.626 578.622 10,66 651.652 12,01 1.097.384
4 20,23 - 2.194.629 40,45 60.437 1,11 4.582.724 84,46
1791-1795 4.013.097 208.338 5,19 503.950 12,56 697.566 17,38 - 1.885.931 46,99 71.647 1,79 3.367.432 83,91
1796-1800 5.357.909 302.958 5,65 572.256 10,68 376.413 7,03 - 2.348.929 43,84 46.581 0,87 3.647.137 68,07
1801-1805 5.647.684 248.188 4,39 572.029 10,13 487.021 8,62 - 2.997.262 53,07 60.285 1,07 4.364.785 77,28
1806-1810 4.876.211 204.162 4,19 632.423 12,97 489.898 10,05 - 3.426.845 70,28 65.202 1,34 4.818.530 98,82
Total 40.803.388 3.093.110 7,58 3.838.291 9,41 3.793.357 9,30 650.715 1,59 20.912.677 51,25 732.649 1,80 33.020.799 80,93
Notes:
1 It only includes four years since information for 1769 was not found.
2 It does not include 1752.
3 It only includes 1764 and 1765
4 It does not include 1788.




REVENUES OF THE CARTAGENA TREASURY
(1751-1810)
Liquor Tobbaco Custom Taxes Avería Situado  SisaIt should also be noted that these revenues from duties on international
trade flows were to a large extent another subsidy that the rest of New
Granada gave to Cartagena, since almost all exports and imports
handled by Cartagena came from or had as their destination  the
interior of the Viceroyalty.
28 In a sense, then,  the taxes paid by those
interior provinces belonged to them. However,  it was Cartagena which
mainly benefited from these levies since all revenues collected from
duties on foreign trade were assigned to cover the city’s military
expenses.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF FISCAL EXPENDITURES
The main economic impact of the situado in Cartagena was on local
expenditures. The structure of these expenditures will next be
discussed briefly, using as an example the data for one year, 1795,
since it seems that, from year to year, the basic pattern of expenditures
underwent little change.28
Table 3 shows the expenditures corresponding to 1795, a
representative year.  The bulk of the city´s expenses were on defense
and military purposes. The construction of fortifications and artillery
infrastructure absorbed 11.22 % and 1.08 % of the outlays,
respectively. However, the largest share of the expenses, 48.82 %,
went to pay the salaries of the troops and officers. Other military
expenses were the costs of the campaign to subdue the Indians of the
                                                                                                                
28 After the independence from Spain, taxes on foreign trade stopped being a revenue of the ports




  - Treasury and Justice 23.430 3,64
  - Veteran Troops 225.518 35,03
  - Militias 64.014 9,94
  - Military Staff 24.700 3,84
  - Inquisition 6.466 1,00
  - Invalids and retired personnel 9.042 1,40
Subtotal 353.170 54,86
Artillery works 6.932 1,08
Fortifications 72.232 11,22
Coast Guard 181.923 28,26
General and extraordinary 11.042 1,72
Hospitals 17.724 2,75
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Darien region and the maintenance of the coastguard. Total military
outlays added to 89.49 % of the city’s expenditures.
The backward linkages of military expenses with the local economy
must have been very high, since the salaries were spent, to a large
extent, on locally produced goods and services ( housing, food,
personal services, shoes, clothes, furniture, amusement). As a result,
at the time Cartagena had a fairly dynamic group of local artisans
engaged in the production of goods for the local market. In the census
of 1777, a total of 499 artisans were listed in the information available
for four of the five sections in which the city was divided. Shoemakers,
tailors, carpenters, and bakers comprised the largest groups.
29
V. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the fiscal revenues of Cartagena de Indias from 1751
to 1810 is very useful for an understanding of different aspects of the
economy of the city and of the Caribbean region of the Viceroyalty of
                                     
29 Meisel y Aguilera,Op.Cit. , p.50.30
New Granada in the closing decades of the Spanish Empire in the New
World.
A first conclusion is that the analysis of the evolution of Cartagena’s
fiscal revenues shows that the city was experiencing a period of
vigorous economic expansion. That economic growth, however, was
not based on the region’s export base but on the enormous transfer of
funds- particularly the situado,  to subsidize its military expenditures-
that the port received every  year of the period 1751-1810.
30
It has also been shown that Cartagena’s total fiscal revenues were
highly dependent on the situado that it received from the rest of the
Viceroyalty of New Granada and other treasuries of the Spanish
Empire in America.
31 In fact the situado  was the engine driving the
city’s economy, and to a large extent also the economy of the
Caribbean Coast of New Granada.
                                     
30 For the period 1751-1810 the information on the fiscal revenues of Cartagena is available for
every single year except 1769. In each of the available years the city received the situado.
31 From the information available in the Cartas Cuentas of Cartagena it is not possible to trace the
origin of the situado. However, in the period 1751-1810 in four occasions ( 1757, 1758, 1759, and
1760) transfers from Havana for a total value of 331.017 silver pesos were reported. This transfers
from Havana were typically the redistribution through the Caribbean of the amounts assigned to the
Viceroyalty of New Spain as situado and which were channeled via Cuba.31
In the eighteenth century, Cartagena’s hinterland was very sparsely
populated and lacked a vigorous agricultural sector producing for
export markets. Thus, the limited agricultural activity found in the region
mainly supplied the consumption needs of Cartagena and Mompox,
the largest markets of the northern coast.
After New Granada won its independence from Spain the economy of
Cartagena collapsed and the city’s population dropped year by year
from the 25.000 inhabitants it had in 1810 to only 8.603 by 1870. With
the disappearance of the Spanish Empire, Cartagena’s key military role
had ceased. Thus, there was no reason to maintain its garrisons and
fortifications. And, of course, there was no longer a reason to subsidize
her with enormous subsidies transferred from other regions of New
Granada. That is why its economy, which had been subsidy-led in the
pre-independence era, collapsed when the Spaniards left. A tragic
irony for a city that fought bravely for its independence.
32
                                     
32 In 1815, a Spanish army sent from the peninsula to recapture New Granada put Cartagena under
siege for  108 days and more than 2.000 of the city´s inhabitants died, mostly from hunger or due to
the spread of epidemics, Rodolfo Segovia Salas, “Cartagena heroica, el sacrificio que cuesta un
siglo”, Boletin Cultural y Bibliografico, Vol. XVI, No. 5, 1979.